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COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 890463 CA 
LOUIE EDWIN SIMS, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
INTRODUCTION 
Pursuant to motion of appellant, this court ordered 
that supplemental briefs be filed in the above-entitled case. 
The motion requested that the parties brief three cases that have 
been decided subsequent to the oral argument held in this case on 
February 27, 1990. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall 
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issue but upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the person or 
thing to be seized, 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Because the roadblock in the instant case was not 
established to address a particular state interest, any intrusion 
on individuals' privacy interests resulting from that roadblock 
violates the Fourth Amendment. There was neither a warrant nor 
individualized suspicion to justify the stop of appellant. 
Consequently, Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah 
was violated by the roadblock stop of appellant. A consent 
following an illegal stop does not make the fruits of that stop 
admissible. The State must show that the evidence was not 
obtained by police exploitation of that primary illegality and 
that the evidence was obtained by means sufficiently 
distinguishable from the stop to be purged of the taint from that 
stop. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION 
REGARDING SOBRIETY ROADBLOCKS DOES 
NOT AFFECT THE OUTCOME OF THIS 
CASE. 
In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 
U.S. , 110 S.Ct. 2481 (1990), the Supreme Court held that 
the use of sobriety checkpoints to curb the problem of drunk 
driving on the highways does not violate the Fourth Amendment, 
The ruling and the analysis it employs is inapplicable to this 
case. In determining that such roadblocks do not violate the 
Fourth Amendment, the Court employed the balancing test described 
in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979). Brown requires courts to 
balance the state's interests against both the effectiveness of 
the state's action in achieving that interest and the intrusion 
on the individual's privacy. 
In applying this balancing test the Court gave 
substantial weight to the problem of drunk driving in this 
country and the carnage that has resulted from the alcohol 
related traffic accidents. The roadblock in Sitz was established 
in accordance with guidelines promulgated by a "Sobriety 
Checkpoint Advisory Committee." The guidelines set procedures 
governing checkpoint operations, site selection and publicity. 
The committee was comprised of representatives of state and local 
police, prosecutors and the University of Michigan Transportation 
Research Institute. 
The roadblock in this case was not limited to one 
particular state interest. Sergeant Mangelson testified that the 
purpose of the roadblock was to detect any criminal or traffic 
violation. The time and place of the roadblock were not governed 
by any guidelines to limit the potential interference with 
travelers. 
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In Sitz, the drunk driving problem was balanced against 
the effectiveness of the procedure and the nature of the 
intrusion. The Court focused on the minimal objective intrusion 
to law abiding citizens and rejected the Michigan court's 
emphasis on the subjective intrusion to motorists. The Court 
then noted that the analysis of the degree to which the seizure 
advances the public interest "was not meant to transfer from 
politically accountable officials to the courts the decision as 
to which among reasonable law enforcement techniques should be 
employed to deal with a serious public danger." Id. at 2483. 
The court found that the checkpoint resulted in the DUI arrests 
of 1.5 percent of the drivers stopped. This was greater than the 
percentage of arrests made at the permanent border checkpoint 
that was upheld in United States v. Martinez-Fuente, 428 U.S. 543 
(1976). 
The nature of the stop and length of the intrusion for 
the general motoring public involved in the roadblock at issue in 
the instant case was not great. However, since there was no 
particular reason to make the stop, there is no way to enter the 
effectiveness of the intrusion into the balancing equation. 
Therefore, the balance of the interests in this case indicates 
that the Fourth Amendment was violated. When an intrusion is not 
made to solve a particular and significant law enforcement 
concern, the stop is indistinguishable from that conducted in 
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Brown v. Texas, to check identification. It is also closely 
analogous to the roving random vehicle stops for traffic 
violations which Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 684 (1979) 
prohibited. 
The Court in Sitz did not allow roadblocks to be used 
for general crime detection. The Court held that a very 
substantial problem of drunk driving justified the minimal 
intrusion of the roadblock. In this case, the general need to 
detect crime cannot be used to justify seizures that are not 
based on any showing of individualized suspicion. If that were 
allowed, the Fourth Amendment would be meaningless. The 
roadblock in this case fails to pass the balancing test employed 
in Sitz; consequently, it violated the Fourth Amendment. The 
evidence seized from appellantfs vehicle as a result of that stop 
must be ordered suppressed. 
Point II 
A WARRANTLESS STOP OF A VEHICLE CAN 
ONLY BE JUSTIFIED BY A SHOWING OF 
PROBABLE CAUSE AND AN EXIGENT 
CIRCUMSTANCE THAT PRECLUDES 
OFFICERS FROM OBTAINING A SEARCH 
WARRANT. 
In State v. Larocco, P.2d , 135 U.A.R. 16 (Utah 
1990), the court addressed the issue of whether the inspection of 
a vehicle identification number (VIN) violated the Fourth 
Amendment and Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah. 
The court of appeals held that the opening of the vehicle door to 
-5-
look at the VIN did not implicate any Fourth Amendment interests. 
State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). On 
certiorari Justice Durham authored an opinion that was joined by 
Justice Zimmerman. In that opinion, Justice Durham found that 
the VIN inspection violated Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
In State v. Larocco, Justice Durham held that Article 
I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah required the State to 
show that there was both probable cause and exigent circumstances 
to justify a warrantless vehicle search. The basis of this 
holding was a need to simplify the rules regarding warrantless 
vehicle stops. She reviewed the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment 
rulings on such stops and found them inconsistent. The 
inconsistencies, she held, were a result of the Court's 
misapplication of the doctrine relating to the reasonable 
expectation of privacy as it affected the warrant requirement of 
the Fourth Amendment. 
Justice Durham noted that the expectation of privacy 
doctrine was originally employed to determine if the Fourth 
Amendment was implicated in a search or seizure. However, in 
recent cases the Supreme Court has used the level of the 
claimant's expectation of privacy to determine if a warrant is 
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required. This has resulted in the warrant clause of the 
Fourth Amendment improperly being read as part of the 
2 
reasonableness clause. In Larocco, Justice Durham's position 
was that the question of the privacy interest is a threshold 
issue to determine if Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution is implicated. 
Justice Durham then found that Article I, Section 14 
contains two separate requirements and both must be satisfied to 
3 
find a warrantless search valid. There must be a showing that 
the search was reasonable (based on probable cause). There must 
also be a showing that a warrant was obtained or there were 
See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974), and California v. 
Carney, 471 U.S., 386 (1985). 
2 
The Fourth Amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
3 
Article I, Section 14 provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall 
issue but upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the person or 
thing to be seized. 
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exigent circumstances that prevented the officers from obtaining 
a warrant. With respect to exigent circumstances, Justice Durham 
stated ". . .warrantless searches will be permitted only where 
they satisfy their traditional justification, namely, to protect 
the safety of police or the public or to prevent the destruction 
of evidence." 135 U.A.R. at 23. 
In Larocco, Justice Durham found that the officers had 
probable cause to believe the vehicle in question was stolen. 
However, there were no exigent circumstances to justify the 
warrantless opening of the vehicle door to check the VIN. With 
respect to roadblocks, the problem is that there is neither a 
warrant, exigent circumstances, nor individualized suspicion that 
a crime has been committed. (See, Point I B. of appellant's 
opening brief.) Consequently, a roadblock stop fails to meet 
both the requirements of Justice Durham's Larocco standard. On 
this basis, the roadblock stop violates Article I, Section 14 of 
the Constitution of Utah. 
This conclusion is reinforced when the rationale used 
to justify a roadblock is considered. In Michigan Department of 
Public Safety v. Sitzy a balancing test was employed to determine 
if a sobriety roadblock violated the Fourth Amendment. The 
State's interest is balanced against the effectiveness of the 
action taken to achieve that interest and the intrusion to 
individual's privacy. This reasoning was expressly rejected in 
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Larocco. It fails to account for the warrant clause of the 
Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, the analysis of privacy interests 
is misapplied. 
In Larocco, Justices Howe and Hall joined in a 
dissenting opinion and concluded that under a Fourth Amendment 
analysis, the inspection of the VIN did not involve a search 
implicating Fourth Amendment interests. The dissenters relied on 
New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986), which held that a similar 
VIN inspection did not constitute a search. 
Justice Stewart concurred in the result of Justice 
Durham's opinion. There was no indication of what his view is on 
Article I, Section 14. However, in cases authored both before 
and after Larocco, Justice Stewart has required that warrantless 
searches be made pursuant to the specific and well established 
exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48 
(Ut. 1981); State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132 (Ut. 1989); State 
v. Arroyo, P.2d , 137 U.A.R. 13 (Ut. 1990). In other 
words, it does not appear that Justice Stewart would be willing 
to engage in the type balancing of analysis that disregards the 
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. With respect to the 
roadblock in this case, there was no warrant, and there is no 
exception to the warrant requirement to justify the search. 
Although Justice Stewart's opinions on Article I, Section 14 are 
unknown, a roadblock search would not appear to fit within his 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. 
The important conclusion that can be reached with 
respect to the effect of the Larocco decision on this case are 
twofold. First, at least two justices of the Utah Supreme Court 
would likely hold that a roadblock violates Article I, Section 14 
of the Utah Constitution. Second, based on his prior opinions, 
it would appear that Justice Stewart would begin his analysis by 
discussing whether the roadblock fell within one of the well 
established exceptions to the warrant requirement. Since 
roadblock stops do not fall within such an exception, it is 
likely that Justice Stewart would reach the same conclusion on 
roadblocks as he did on warrantless VIN inspections in Larocco. 
The effect of Larocco would likely be a finding by the Utah 
Supreme Court that the roadblock was unconstitutional and the 
evidence would be ordered suppressed. 
Point III 
THE STATE MUST SHOW THAT ANY 
CONSENT WAS NOT OBTAINED THROUGH 
THE EXPLOITATION OF THE ILLEGAL 
STOP. 
In State v. Arroyo, supra, the Utah Supreme Court 
reversed the Court of Appeals1 holding that a voluntary consent 
in and of itself alleviates the taint of a prior illegal stop or 
search. State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153 (Ut. App. 1989) The state 
supreme court held that there must be a two part analysis: 
First, there must be a voluntary consent. Second, the consent 
must not have been obtained through police exploitation of the 
primary or antecedent police illegality. To be admissible, the 
State must show the evidence was obtained by means sufficiently 
distinguishable from the illegal stop to be purged of the primary 
taint. 
The court went on to note that the basis of the second 
part of this analysis is found in the "fruit of the poisonous 
tree" doctrine established in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 
471 (1963). With respect to the manner in which this doctrine 
related to consent searches, the court stated, "The 'fruit of the 
poisonous tree' doctrine has been extended to invalidate consents 
which, despite being voluntary, are nonetheless the exploitation 
of a prior illegality." 137 U.A.R. at 16. The court then cited 
with approval cases that reached that same conclusion. 
The legal authority on this issue for the decision 
employed in the court of appeals was the Tenth Circuit case of 
United States v. Carson, 793 F.2d 1141 (10th Cir.), cert, den. 
479 U.S. 914 (1986). However, the Supreme Court found that the 
decision in Carson failed to provide adequate protections to 
Fourth Amendment interests. The court stated, "Police should not 
be permitted to ratify their own illegal conduct by merely 
obtaining a consent after the illegality has occurred." Id. at 
16. The court went on to find that the Carson rule failed to 
effectuate either of the two purposes of the exclusionary rule. 
First, police are not deterred for violating the Fourth 
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Amendment. Second, the courts became a party to that illegal 
conduct. 
The position taken by appellant throughout these 
proceedings is that all of the fruits of the illegal stop should 
4 
be ordered suppressed. The same arguments adopted by the court 
5 
in Arroyo were previously made by appellant. The remedy ordered 
in Arroyo was to remand the case to the district court for that 
court to make findings on the question whether the consent was 
obtained through exploitation of the primary illegality, or if 
the consent was obtained by means sufficiently distinguishable to 
be purged of the primary taint. Assuming that the roadblock stop 
violated either the Fourth Amendment or Article Ir Section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution, this case should be remanded for the trial 
court to make appropriate findings on the "fruits" issue. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court's decision in the Sitz case does not 
legitimize the roadblock in the instant case under the Fourth 
Amendment. The Larocco decision gives added authority to 
appellant's argument that the lack of individualized suspicion 
makes the roadblock at issue in this case unreasonable. Finally, 
the Arroyo case makes untenable appellee's position that a 
4 
See: Opening brief of appellant at pp. 20, 38; Reply brief of 
appellant at p. 5. 
5 
See Point II of Appellant's reply brief. 
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voluntary consent makes the fruits of any stop admissible. The 
roadblock stop of appellant's vehicle violated both Article I, 
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution. The judgment and conviction 
should be reversed and the case remanded to the district court to 
determine if the evidence seized from the search of appellant's 
vehicle was obtained through exploitation of that illegality. 
DATED this day of August, 1990. 
G. FRED METOS 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Supplemental Brief of Appellant was mailed/delivered to 
Dan R. Larson, Assistant Attorney General, at 236 State Capitol 
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